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Abstract 
Social Impact Bonds (SIBs) are a novel financing mechanism for public services delivery.  This special 
issue about SIBs in the UK argue that they necessitate closer examination to understand the 
implications for all stakeholders. This introductory paper critically explores and challenges dominant 
practitioner narratives of SIBs as ‘win-win’ solutions for governments and service providers.  While 
SIBs may foster innovation it is unclear if they deliver better value given the complexity of public 
services.  SIBs are a strategically ambiguous policy tool and policymakers should be cautious about 
SIBs due to contractual complexity and issues with ethics, governance, accountability and 
transparency. 
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Policy highlights (25 words each): 
 Social Impact Bonds are a nascent area of academic research that merits further 
multidisciplinary analysis 
 SIBs are a strategically ambiguous policy tool  
 There is insufficient evidence as to whether and how SIBs deliver better outcomes than 
conventional forms of financing 
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Introduction 
What are Social Impact Bonds, why do they matter, and what effect have they had?  These were the 
questions that guided this Special Issue of the JEPR and emerged from the first international academic 
conference about Social Impact Bonds held on 12-13 September 2016 in London, United Kingdom.  
This special issue brings together academic contributions that explore new theoretical and empirical 
directions in analysing Social Impact Bonds with the aim of furthering academic debate on the role of 
private interests in the delivery of public services.   
Social Impact Bonds (SIBs) are a relatively new type of performance-pay contract for public services 
provision where government purchasers partner with private for-profit investors, or social investors 
(who seek a blend of financial return and social good) to fund interventions tackling social problems.  
The UK is a global leader in the development of SIB interventions, namely the world’s first SIB aimed 
at reducing reoffending at HMP Peterborough Prison in 2010 (Disley et al. 2011), since followed by 
several Central Government-led SIBs focused on Youth Engagement, Training and Employment 
(Thomas, Griffiths, and Pemberton 2014), homelessness (Mason, Lloyd, and Nash 2017) and in Health 
and Social Care (Fraser, Tan, Kruithof, et al. 2018).   
SIBs have since been applied to some of society’s most intractable social problems around the world 
and are known as Pay for Success projects in the US and as Development Impact Bonds (DIBs) in low-
middle income countries, such as India and Colombia.  As an early innovator in the application of SIBs 
to public services delivery, the UK’s experience is instructive to a wider international audience as 
other countries draw on the theoretical and empirical developments in the UK to guide and frame 
their policy experiments with SIBs.  To date, there are 32 impact bonds in the UK, 10 in the US, and 19 
others in 14 countries that include Australia, Canada, Colombia, India, Japan, the Netherlands, and 
New Zealand (Floyd 2017). Despite their widespread proliferation, there is much debate about what a 
SIB is and who benefits most from their use.       
What are Social Impact Bonds? 
Some policymakers and social entrepreneurs are enthusiastic about SIBs as a financing mechanism in 
public services because they are often described as a risk-free way to experiment with innovative or 
untested policy interventions where private, philanthropic or social investors provide up-front 
financing for service delivery that is only reimbursed by government if outcomes are met. What’s 
more, they are expected to enable greater accountability and deliver better outcomes than 
conventional forms of government purchasing, such as block contracting. Seen this way, SIBs can offer 
a ‘win-win’ solution for all stakeholders, where socially minded investors can foster promising 
preventative interventions while providers receive the necessary funds to scale-up existing work, and 
government purchasers only pay for successful programming (Fraser, Tan, Lagarde, et al. 2018).   
However, in practice, public services contracting is complex and there is limited evidence in support 
of paying entirely on outcomes from the performance-pay literature (Lagarde et al. 2013).  Technical 
challenges also exist in evaluation which makes it difficult to attribute changes in outcomes to the SIB 
itself (McHugh et al. 2013, Sinclair et al. 2014, Roy, McHugh, and Sinclair 2017) and in the absence of 
independent evaluation with a counterfactual, attribution relies  on observed outcomes rather than 
comparison against a control group (Fox Under review, Fraser, Tan, Kruithof, et al. 2018).  SIBs 
therefore merit critical examination to assess whether, and how, they might deliver on their promises.   
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SIBs demonstrate a high degree of ‘strategic ambiguity’ (Smith 2013, Smith 2017, Eisenberg 1984), so 
that they can be framed in different ways for different audiences (Smith 2017).    For example, SIBs 
can be framed as a pro-social intervention to improve public services, driven by collaborative, cross-
sector expertise among those from the private, public and voluntary sectors (GO Lab 2017).  At the 
same time, SIBs can be framed as a ‘financial’ innovation that delivers better value for money through 
the rigour and discipline of the market to deliver blended social and financial outcomes (Liebman 
2011, European Parliament 2014).   
This strategic ambiguity has resulted in varied applications and justification for experimentation with 
SIBs as a policy tool in different national contexts.  For example, in the UK, they have been particularly 
appealing for policymakers in an economic climate where public services have been pressed to ‘do 
more with less’ – especially under financial austerity following the Great Recession of 2008.  While in 
the US, SIBs appeal to policymakers on both sides of the political spectrum because they offer liberals 
an opportunity to expand service provision and conservatives a mechanism for private investment 
and involvement in public services delivery (Government Accountability Office 2015). 
The UK experience is instructive of the shifting definition and aims of the SIB as a policy tool.  In the 
UK, SIBs can vary in how financial risks are shared among stakeholders and how social benefits are 
defined, measured and attributed (Fraser, Tan, Kruithof, et al. 2018).  This is often ascribed to the 
nascent nature of the SIB itself so it is expected that they will be continually refined with each 
successive iteration as the SIB market grows.  Proponents have proclaimed how SIBs can offer many, 
potentially divergent, advantages to government purchasers, such as new ways to facilitate joint 
commissioning and partner working (Jupp 2017), to instil market discipline on non-profit service 
providers (Bridges Impact and BAML 2014), or as a means to promote social benefit and learning 
opportunities for investors.  For local and national policymakers in the UK, SIBs can provide a 
financing mechanism to fund a pilot or untested intervention that might otherwise be difficult to 
launch (Fraser, Tan, Kruithof, et al. 2018). However, it is important to be cautious as it is difficult for a 
single policy tool to serve as a ‘magic bullet’ given the complexity of public services delivery. SIBs 
necessitate closer examination to understand the potential downsides or risks they present for all 
stakeholders.   
In practice, despite the ‘win-win’ rhetoric, the market has developed more slowly than early 
proponents predicted.  This has raised questions as how, and whether, investor and government 
interests can be aligned because SIB-financed initiatives that are rational choices for governments are 
unlikely to be attractive to investors (and vice versa).  The paradoxical ways in which SIBs are 
portrayed (Giacomantonio 2017, Maier, Barbetta, and Godina 2016), highlights their ‘chameleonic’ 
characteristics as they appeal to different audiences in different ways (Smith 2013).  In this special 
issue we call for a wider perspective on SIBs that is cognizant of the varied ways SIBs are portrayed 
and the disputed narratives that exist about the main objectives of this financing mechanism.  In 
doing so, this editorial questions whether it is possible to contract out accountable and efficient 
public services that achieve blended social benefits alongside private financial returns.   
Why do they matter? 
SIBs’ strategic ambiguity has advantages for both their proponents and critics.  At times, SIBs are 
lauded for their potential to foster innovation (Leventhal 2012), to ‘scale-up’ evidence-based 
programs (Burand 2012, Rudd and et al. 2013, Maier and Meyer 2017), or to enable flexible and 
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personalised services tailored to service users (Jackson 2013).  At the same time, SIBs are promoted 
as a tool to improve productivity and value for money, or promote more measurement and 
accountability (Mulgan et al. 2011, Liebman 2011).  Alongside their novelty, these rationales for 
pursuing SIBs in both local and central policymaking has created a situation where every outcome 
from a SIB initiative can be thought of as a success under one lens or another – in essence, a situation 
in which no one (or at least no one SIB) can entirely fail. For example, the Rikers Island SIB in New 
York was cancelled after three years of operation, short of the six years it was contracted for, because 
it failed to meet its stated outcomes. However, some proponents did not see it as a failure because 
the funding from private sources protected the government purchaser from investing in an 
intervention that did not deliver on its promises; and conversely that the intervention had a positive 
impact on some service recipients even though it did not meet specified metrics (Porter 2015).  
Beyond the popular press however, scholars offering critiques state   that claims of effectiveness 
remain unfounded, that SIBs may prove costlier than traditional financing methods for public 
commissioners and that they may ultimately fail to transfer risk from the public to the private sector 
(McHugh et al, 2013; Warner, 2013; Dowling & Harvie, 2014; Sinclair et al, 2014). 
The traction SIBs have gained in policy circles also relates to their emergence in a difficult economic 
climate and is apparent in a recent literature review on SIBs in high-income settings that identified 
three emergent narratives (Fraser, Tan, Lagarde, et al. 2018). The first narrative was a ‘public sector 
reform narrative’ premised on the view that public, non-profit and voluntary sector organisations 
have important shortcomings in terms of service design, delivery and accountability, that require 
private sector management techniques and values, such as financial incentives and ‘market discipline’ 
to remedy these issues (Liebman 2011, Mulgan et al. 2011). The second, labelled a ‘financial sector 
reform narrative,’ suggests that private sector actors, in particular, management consultancies and 
specialist intermediary organisations, can effect socially worthwhile change through social 
entrepreneurship whilst simultaneously pursuing commercial interests (Cohen 2011, Liebman 2011, 
Moore, Westley, and Nicholls 2012, Nicholls and Murdock 2012). Seen as such, SIBs are the latest 
iteration in a stream of neoliberal public policy reforms aimed at increasing private sector delivery 
initiated in the 1980s under the Thatcher-led Conservative Government in the UK.  These two 
narratives, which are often mutually reinforcing, dominate the literature produced by SIB proponents.  
In contrast, the third, ‘cautionary narrative’ is more prevalent within the academic literature, and 
diverges from the first two by taking a more critical view of SIBs on ideological grounds as being 
antithetical to public values and enabling the ‘financialisation’ of public services (Lake 2015, Warner 
2013, Tse and Warner 2018).  Further, the third narrative takes issue with SIBs on pragmatic grounds 
from issues related to outcomes-based contracting and the transfer of risk between public and 
private parties (Fraser, Tan, Lagarde, et al. 2018). The contrasting discourses surrounding SIBs further 
highlights their malleability and the possible consequences of their use as a mechanism to scale-up 
outcomes-based contracting or performance-pay which could also erode governance and 
transparency through the financialisation of public services (Warner 2015, Tse and Warner 2018).   
SIBs are technically difficult to commission and require complex contractual relationships between 
different actors.  There are not yet established norms or ‘rules of the game’ for the actors involved.  
Early process evaluations noted that SIBs take time to set-up and involve high transactions costs (Tan 
et al. 2015). By their nature, SIBs feature both public sector contracts and private loan or financing 
arrangements and so highlight the inherent conflict between the relative openness of public sector 
contracting and the closed nature of private financial arrangements.  SIB contracts require greater 
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scrutiny as private sector investors or providers may place profit motives above the interests of 
service recipients (Warner 2013). SIBs are plagued with problems of technical complexity for service 
commissioners and high transactions costs (Maier, Barbetta, and Godina 2016).   
What effect have they had?  
While SIBs expand, there is limited evidence that they produce better outcomes for service recipients, 
or are more cost-effective than direct public financing for public services.  The available empirical 
evidence from the UK is comprised of largely qualitative evaluations with no rigorous attempt to test 
outcomes against a counterfactual control or comparator group or to demonstrate attribution so that 
interventions are paid-out based on observed qualitative outcomes control or comparator group 
(Mason, Lloyd, and Nash 2017, Thomas, Griffiths, and Pemberton 2014, Disley et al. 2015, Disley et al. 
2011, Fraser, Tan, Kruithof, et al. 2018, Anders and Dorsett 2017).  See Fox et al. (under review) of 
this special issue for a systematic review of the empirical evidence from the UK.  This undermines the 
basic claim of SIBs – that they enable governments to only pay for demonstrated outcomes.  Only in 
the Peterborough SIB, were outcomes based on performance against a control cohort and evaluated 
by independent evaluators (Jolliffe and Hedderman 2014, Anders and Dorsett 2017).  The 
independent quantitative analysis reported a significant reduction in reoffending against a controlled 
cohort (Anders and Dorsett 2017).  By contrast, in the US, early SIBs were characterised by more 
rigorous methods to demonstrate attribution such as randomised design (Government Performance 
Lab 2017), for example, in the use of randomised controlled trials (RCTs) at Rikers Island (Parsons, 
Weiss, and Wei 2016). At present, more robust evaluations are required in order to identify what the 
‘SIB effect’ may be and whether they deliver better outcomes than alternative forms of funding public 
services delivery.In spite of the limited empirical evidence of success, policy enthusiasm for SIBs 
remains strong. This may be due to the popular public service and financial sector reform narratives 
that surround SIBs related to  de-risking provision, and the reform of public services and the potential 
to attract new forms of investment.  However, SIBs have not yet delivered on their promises.  Careful 
metrics limit innovation as investors want sure returns; risk still largely remains with the public sector: 
and private finance (beyond philanthropy or social investors) has failed to invest. This has caused 
some to critique SIBs as only providing innovation on the finance side, arguing that SIBs are nothing 
more than a new investment strategy which does little to promote real social service innovation (Lake 
2015, Tse and Warner 2018). That this financialization is focused solely on socially marginalised 
groups raises concerns about the loss of public values and democratic accountability (Warner 2015).   
Contribution of this special issue 
The papers that form this special issue emerged following the first international academic conference 
on SIBs in London on 12 and 13 September 2016 (presentations and blogs from this conference are 
available at: http://www.piru.ac.uk/events/widening-perspectives-on-social-impact-bonds.html). This 
was the first attempt to collect academic perspectives on SIBs with the aim of critically exploring and 
challenging dominant practitioner narratives of the SIB as a ‘win-win’ solution for governments and 
service providers.  
This special issue brings together a number of theoretical developments (Morley Under review, 
Sinclair, McHugh, and Roy Under review) that consider the moral implications of SIBs and critique the 
financialisation of public services and service users, as well as highlight the need for evaluation (Fox 
Under review) and more direct empirical analysis of SIBs (Carter Under review, Fraser et al. Under 
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review).  These papers provide a valuable contribution to the nascent theoretical and empirical 
literature on SIBs to challenge the ‘win-win’ narrative that SIBs can enable accountable and efficient 
public services that achieve blended social benefits alongside private financial returns.  While SIBs 
may enable greater innovation in delivery due to the focus on outcomes, it is important to note that 
valid concerns remain for policymakers to consider due to the ethical considerations about the role of 
private values in public services delivery and practical issues such as transparency and contractual 
complexity.  
This special issue is comprised of work emanating from the UK.  While this is in line with the 
development of SIBs so far, it highlights the need for more international and cross-country 
comparison research in order to understand the range of experience with SIBs across different policy 
contexts. This will help to build a robust evidence base and expand academic knowledge about SIBs 
alongside interdisciplinary approaches that blend public management, economics, and social and 
impact investment literatures.  
Theoretical developments  
New theoretical approaches for analysing SIBs call for greater scrutiny around the role of 
marketisation and financialisation in the formulation of public services and for service users to be 
actively involved in the design of services they receive. 
Julia Morley’s (2019) paper considers the moral implications of SIBs and the marketisation of public 
services.  This paper draws on the ethical considerations detailed in work by Debra Satz (Satz 2010) on 
the moral limits of the market.  This paper calls attention to the information asymmetry in provider 
relationships and the potential for SIBs to foster adverse behaviours, arguing SIBs might best operate 
as a niche funding mechanism that complements existing public provision but requires more 
regulation and transparency to ensure user voices are considered.    
Stephen Sinclair et al. (2019) analyse and challenge some of the underlying normative and policy 
assumptions underpinning SIBs and advocate for a more participatory approach to social policy.  They 
argue that SIBs transform service users into social problems, reframed as potential sources of 
financial revenue rather than treating them as conscious agents and citizens.  They problematize the 
lack of participatory processes in SIB development and propose engagement with service users’ 
subjective experiences and preferences to move towards a bottom-up approach to policy and 
evaluation.  
Empirical contributions 
New empirical evidence is presented about how SIBs are commissioned  and their implications for 
governance, accountability and evaluation. 
Alec Fraser et al. (2019) compares  why one proposed SIB financed intervention was not initiated to 
one that was.  The authors draw on a ‘decentred’ approach to governance (Bevir and Rhodes 2007, 
Bevir and Richards 2009) to highlight the importance of situated agency and traditions in the face of 
policy dilemmas and demonstrates the key roles played by local actors in deciding whether to pursue 
a SIB. They argue that a shift from a competitive quasi-market service commissioning mechanisms to 
new forms of outcomes-based commissioning may require more collaborative approaches to service 
procurement. 
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Eleanor Carter’s (2019) paper examines the accountability mechanisms available in different social 
programmes.  She then compares the accountability arrangements in the Department for Work and 
Pensions’s Payment by Results (PbR) employment scheme with the Innovation Fund’s employment-
focused SIB interventions to understand whether SIBs enable trust-led relational network governance  
in public services delivery.   
Finally, Chris Fox et al (2019) present a systematic review of empirical evaluations of SIB programs in 
the UK since 2010 when SIBs first appeared.  They identify the limitations of the current evidence and 
the conceptual and practical difficulties of evaluating such programmes.  They provide some positive 
suggestions for approaches that may mitigate some of these difficulties and expand on what is known 
in the literature on outcomes-based funding and its evaluation. 
Conclusion 
This special issue brings together academic contributions that explore new theoretical and empirical 
directions in analysing Social Impact Bonds. These papers draw out important considerations about 
governance, transparency, accountability and the need for defined rules as the SIB market progresses.  
This special issue has highlighted the potential for conflicts of interest, governance and accountability 
challenges and the contractual complexity inherent in SIBs.   
Which actors benefit most from participation in a SIB?  The empirical evidence suggests that service 
providers face high managerial pressure within their organisations and from intermediaries and 
investment managers, while investors and intermediaries are not necessarily making profits from 
operational SIBs.  More research and independent evaluation is required to ground early theoretical 
critiques in empirical data to understand the benefits and disadvantages of SIBs.  However, early 
evidence provided in this special issue challenges the narrative that SIBs offer all stakeholders an 
opportunity to engage in a ‘win-win’ project.   
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